There are two obvious problems with this approach. First, political parties themselves only account for a fraction of the total cost since, in many countries, it is rather the candidates themselves and not the parties who shoulder most of the financing for the campaign. Simply adding an analysis of the candidates' financial reports and pretending they are the functional equivalent of the parties -as some have done in the past -will not do. Second, in this era of permanent campaign in the United States (Ornstein, Mann 2000) but also beyond, trying to identify the official electoral season may also turn into a fool's errand.
These preliminary remarks help explain why we are still building so much of the necessary data that must be the sound footing on which to reflect and draw conclusions on political parties' propaganda. A collective effort to gather this data is sorely needed. It should be undertaken with the most deliberate speed. For one, it would help scholars improve their comparative analysis and finally dispel some long-held myths such as the belief that today's campaigns are more expensive and that this inflation should be attributed to the rise of the modern means of communication (see Pinto-Duschinsky 2013) . Constructing this dataset would also allow us to see that the evolution of party spending on propaganda is a reflection of the changes in the way politics is actually conducted and -to put it simply -that it often serves as an indictment of the professionalization of politics. Finally, on a more practical level, it would allow us to avoid some corruption scandals. The example of the Bygmalion case in France is illustrative.
1 Had we had a tool to track the overall spending on political communication and propaganda, the officials at the UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) would not have been tempted to hide some of their candidate's excessive spending above the statutory limit by illegally transferring it to the party's budget (Lazard 2014) . Likewise, having a clearer picture of the cost of political propaganda would have allowed us to identify much earlier the type of illegal party financing scheme that the Front national is now being accused of.
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This chapter proposes to reflect on the relationship between funding and propaganda using a three-pronged approach. The first part will provide some estimates of the amounts spent on propaganda both during and outside of the traditional campaign season and try to link them to the various types of partisan organizations that underwrote them. The second part will attempt to describe some of the underlying social and political constraints that guide this type of spending. The last part will focus on the impact of the campaign finance legal framework on the way political parties communicate to explore the extent to which the law can affect how much parties spend on their communication efforts and what forms their propaganda takes.
POLITICAL MACHINES AND SPENDING ON PROPAGANDA
Despite the difficulties involved in the assessment of the amounts political parties spend on propaganda, one can at least break down this spending into two broad categories: the funds devoted to communication and propaganda in the day-to-day operations on the one hand, and the funds used in electoral campaigns on the other.
In the ordinary course of business, political parties must spend money to organize meetings, conferences and conventions that allow the mingling of its officials and the grassroots, the taking of decisions, elections of officers and -sometimes -communicating basic contents to the 'outside world'. These costly real-life interactions are made even more expensive by the additional costs that they are associated with: transportation, food and lodging, renting office space for meetings, and so on. The amounts spent toward those ends are usually not detailed in the financial reports of the party organizations:
The share of these costs in party budgets is rarely known to the public. Australia is no longer interested in spending details. The United States does not consolidate information on spending. In Israel such particulars are not available in English, and other democracies (among them Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) apply more general categories. (Nassmacher 2009: 67) The parties' internal communication costs also include the price of mailing and subscriptions for the use of telecommunication networks such as the Internet and telephone as well as the cost of creating, editing and publishing of internal newsletters or newspapers. Only rarely do political parties give a detailed account of each of these budgetary items. As Karl-Heinz Nassmacher observed, Canada stands out in this respect. There, the major parties' official financial reports give a rather systematic breakdown of this spending. Rather than the use of multiple examples from different countries with data that are not comparable or even reliable, we decided therefore to rely on the Canadian example to offer a reasonable estimate of what these costs may be.
The period we examined included the federal elections of 1994 and 1998. Interestingly, we see that the five main parties actually devoted fewer resources to the types of spending discussed above in those two years (Table 1 .1). When adding the relevant items (Table 1 .1, rows 5 to 9), we see that these broadly defined internal communication costs represent as much as approximately a third of the overall spending by the parties. Further, in the via free access era of the digital campaign, old-fashioned propaganda continues to thrive with 'Printing and stationery' and 'Party conventions and meetings', representing together around 20 percent of total spending at the dawn of the 21st century. Communication costs incurred by the parties in electoral campaigns can usually be broken down into publishing costs, radio, advertising and direct marketing. Parties also devote funds to commission opinion polls, surveys and research. Table 1 .2 provides an estimate of the spending toward electoral propaganda for some French political parties -eight organizations with receipts over €1.5 million -in 2006, when no specific elections were held, 2012, when there were presidential and parliamentary elections, and 2015, when there were elections for the 'département' and regional levels. The table tracks only the amounts reported to have been spent on propaganda and communication, those given to the candidates and those given to other political entities. It does not include whatever in-kind benefits the parties may have provided the candidates. (2006, 2012, 2015) Table 1 .3), Canadian parties must submit to a higher degree of scrutiny. They provide scholars with detailed financial data from which we can observe that their efforts toward communication and propaganda are more intense than those of their French counterparts. If we add up the amounts spent by the three most profligate parties on advertising and surveys, we find that they devote from half to two thirds of their spending to this kind of spending.
In the United Kingdom, spending on propaganda by the parties who competed in the 2015 General Election represented 90 percent of total spending (Table 1.4, rows 1, 2, 5-9). Among those, we note here as well that traditional means of communication -notably print material and campaign rallies -are still an important source of expenses, accounting for 25 percent of total expenditure.
Beyond the overall figures and the way they break down between traditional or more modern forms of communication, it is necessary to look at the relationship between these efforts to fund propaganda and the diverse type of partisan organization that underwrite them.
Historically, the first great mass political parties appeared as the old western democracies enfranchised new categories of the population and allowed for a more open electoral competition. The new parties were collective political enterprises with national aspirations that, on the strength of the sheer number of their partisans, attempted to contest the monopoly that the great notables had on political representation. The notables' power was based on the social influence they amassed through good works and patronage. They spent tremendous sums to keep up vast networks of citizens who would be in their debt and could thus be used to further their political purposes. Unable to compete on these grounds, the promoters of the first mass political parties tried to replace such traditional electoral transactions for others. Their candidates had to run for office on a common platform of political and policy proposals (in France, it was only in 1881 that a document of the National Assembly first compiled the candidates' electoral manifesto -thus forcing the candidates to submit to this more political understanding of the meaning of the election. To this day, it is still known as 'le Barodet' -after Désiré Barodet, a representative from the Parti radical, who was behind this political innovation). New rules were adopted to fight clientelism and the notabilities' vote buying, such as the requirement for secret ballots. These helped forge this new idea of the vote as the expression of a free and personal choice. The development of political propaganda was built on this great political transformation (which is analyzed notably by Garrigou 2002 and Stokes et al. 2013, Chap. 8) . Table 1 Yet, not all political parties were naturally predisposed to rely solely on purely programmatic promises and campaign platforms to gain votes and power. They continued to rely on more clientelistic modes of mobilization. The political machines that long ruled over American cities are a prominent example. These machines were based on extremely intricate webs of exchange, where votes were traded for services, loyalty for jobs and favors for kickbacks. The money that was collected from businesses was used to subsidize the fidelity of the activists and the services to the citizens (Banfield 1961) . In Palermo, the Christian Democratic Party sold its services to the highest bidder but was always very careful to be parsimonious in its generosity. Its success was built on the great care the party took to give its voters enough so that they would be grateful but not so much that they would not still require more help from it. By keeping this precarious balance, the party could ensure their indefatigable support (Chubb 1981) . In Tunisia, the Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique mastered the art of clientelism to make itself the beating heart of the old authoritarian regime. Under Ben Ali, this partisan organization was fully committed to large-scale clientelism. It assisted the administration in orienting public policy toward the most underprivileged parts of the country for sheer electoral gains (Allal, Geisser 2011) . This model of 'business firm party organizations' (Hopkin, Paolucci 1999 ) underscores the entrepreneurial and capitalist nature of party organizations as well as the importance of their marketing, advertising and survey expenses. It echoes the earlier reflections of Weber (1965 Weber ( [1921 ) and Schumpeter (1942) who saw political parties not simply as groups of volunteers guided by collective objectives or even the common good, but also as organizations geared toward the personal interest of the political entrepreneurs who lead them. In the late 1980s, Panebianco's work on what he called professional political parties substantiated those claims (Panebianco 1988) . He built a model of political parties a more open party competition for voters with much weaker party identity as the barrier to entry for membership in a party was lowered to include potentially all voters. The parties now had to be understood 'as organizations (not institutions) operating in the boundary between state and society' (Margetts 2006) .
.3 Breakdown of election expenses of registered political parties -2015 general election
There is indeed growing reliance on new technologies in politics, but it comes in different shades. As Nick Anstead (2008) demonstrated, the Internet makes it possible for party organizations to develop fundraising in a manner that is seen as socially desirable since it tends to magnify the influence of small donors. The comparative study headed by Bastien and Greffet (2009) also showed that the development of the websites of the major Canadian and French parties was a means for them to disseminate information. They centralized important information such as press releases, electoral news and a schedule for future events as well as information on the candidates and the party platform. These websites also allowed for more interaction between the grassroots and party officials as virtual forums allow everyone to air their opinions and share their views (De Luca, Théviot 2014).
As we can see, the transformations of spending patterns on partisan propaganda only echo deeper structural changes. Political entrepreneurs adapt their modes of communication to their electorate and make do with or without an enlightened citizenry. As the shape of the political market changes, and as the information technology evolves, they also adapt their means of propaganda. It is to these relationships that we now turn.
POLITICAL PROPAGANDA AND SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
The cost of political communications must be understood within a specific political system. Thus, it is obvious that trying to address the 3 million voters that live on the 51 000 square kilometers of Costa Rica cannot compare with mobilizing 800 million Indian voters spread across 3 million square kilometers. In India, the 2014 parliamentary elections were held in nine different steps, from April 7 to May 12, to allow voters to cast their ballot in one of the million polling stations across the country (Le Monde with AFP 2014). The example of the United States also reminds us that the size of the electorate is a central factor in the equation. When attempting to account for the rising cost of US elections over the last 50 years, it is necessary to remember that 'between the years of presidential elections in the United States of 1968 and 2012, the population of voting age more than doubled. Between 1968 and 2012, parties and candidates had to supply their messages to twice as many electors' (Nassmacher 2009: 157) .
As party organizations turn to social networks, online ads and video content, their ranks swell with friends and followers who coexist with more traditional party activists. This is part of a broader trend for party organizations operating in a changing political market, as Susan Scarrow demonstrated in Beyond Party Members (2015) . Her comparative study of party organizations in 19 democracies showed that they operate more and more as 'organizational hybrids, which allow for multiple ways for supporters to affiliate'. By looking at Facebook status, surveying card-carrying party members and poring over the websites of these groups, she was able to give a new analysis of how parties try to mobilize their base in this new era where the very concept of party affiliation has become more complex and diverse: from a simple 'like' on Facebook, to the stronger commitment of volunteers actually knocking on doors for a candidate or a cause. This transformation in the parties' mode of association can at least partially be explained by changing social demands but, more broadly, reminds us that the legitimacy of political parties is dependent on their capacity to convince the electorate that they are still socially relevant.
It is also worth pointing out another important institutional aspect of this discussion. Most of the research dealing with party spending on propaganda tends to focus on very specific ballots, notably presidential elections. This often unintended bias leads us to pay disproportionate attention to these national campaigns where it is necessary to mobilize a very large group of voters spread across a wide territory. By their very nature, these elections tend to push parties and candidates -whose time and resources are often spread thin -to resort more heavily to so-called modern means of mass communication in an attempt to reach as many voters as possible as fast as possible. The same kind of time and financial constraints obviously play much less of a role for a local election in a rural community. Table 1 .5 shows just how much of a financial sacrifice campaign organizations can make to advertise themselves in the media. Still, the very impressive nominal amounts (totaling $763.5 million) have to be put into perspective. As Ansolabehere et al. (2003: 120) point out: 'Real campaign spending has grown sharply, although somewhat more irregularly, over the last 120 years. However, campaign spending as a fraction of national income has shown no growth at all'. As a share of gross national product (GNP), investing in US electoral campaign appears fairly affordable -especially when one considers the potential returns on investment (Gilens 2012) . After all, as columnist George Will likes to point out, every year Americans spend more money on potato chips than on politics. As a matter of fact, the common wisdom that modern forms of political communication are more expensive may be inaccurate. Table 1 .6 details campaign spending by a typical notable at the turn of the 19th century. It shows that the old electioneering practiced by the ancient notables was comparably more onerous than our modern campaigns.
A few comments are warranted. First, when adjusted for inflation, the 5400 francs that the Baron de Mackau spent to get elected in 1902 actually amounts to slightly more than €2 million in 2015. Second, for the record, today's campaign spending ceiling for the current third district of the Orne (more or less the Baron de Mackau's district) is less than €63 000. That being said, the most conspicuous part of the notable's campaign spending is what is devoted to almsgiving. Election year or not, donations to the poor represent between 10 and 25 percent of his annual expenses. This form of perennial charity may look disinterested but it creates a capital of goodwill, loyalty and gratefulness that can be tapped come Election Day. Another interesting insight is that the composition of campaign spending by the notable changes over time. Initially, the largest share was claimed by spending on agents: small sums of money handed out, free drinks, free food . . . standard clientelist expenses. As the baron converts to the modern ways of campaigning that share goes down, while the share devoted to political communication increases dramatically and becomes the number one source of expenses. Interestingly enough, this transformation happens while the overall amounts actually decline, thereby demonstrating that political propaganda actually proves more cost-effective (Phélippeau 2002) .
Skipping over a century to look at campaign spending in the 2012 French presidential elections, one cannot fail to notice that the investment is rather limited when compared with US elections, for reasons mostly having to do with widely different legal campaign finance frameworks (Table 1.7) .
Most of the money in French elections is spent on activities that produce information. The lion's share is taken by expenses on campaign rallies. These rallies are very poor means of direct mobilization (not to mention persuasion), but they are used as an indirect means to broadcast a message. Indeed, as candidates for French elections are prohibited by law to produce and air campaign ads, organizing public rallies and working very hard to have the media cover them is a way for them to try to circumvent this fairly strict limit. Next to public rallies, come expenses on print propaganda. This reliance on one of the oldest forms of propaganda also appears to be a choice by default, imposed by restrictions on using other media platforms. Here, the limited share taken by expenses on the candidates' websites (less than 5 percent) raises the question: are the candidates spending so little on the web because it is a very cheap tool or because they are still not quite convinced of its political efficacy?
As Pinto-Duschinsky (2013) explained, the growing importance of political advertising tends to be overstated. Even in the United States, if TV ads do play a major role in campaigns for the most important federal offices, such as the presidency or Congress, those elections actually represent a sliver of the 519 682 popularly elected officials (Lawless 2012). The overwhelming majority of those elections are contested without a single ad being produced and aired. The same appears to be true in Canada where much of the expenses were incurred on TV and radio advertising by national parties at the federal level, but very little was actually spent on media by the individual candidates themselves (Aucoin 2005) . While it must be acknowledged that candidates running for the highest office in the United States are not the only ones who are resorting to political advertising, it bears noticing that the practice is far from being universal either. At the local level, candidates for mayor in French rural communities tend to forgo advertising entirely (Vignon 2016) . They prefer to rely on mailed questionnaire or e-mail surveys to get their constituents' input on local issues. Town-hall meetings and press releases are becoming more popular, but they remain fairly exceptional. The local media is used to announce a candidacy, take a stand on an issue and attack opponents. Much more than digital social networks, mayors continue to rely on print propaganda and going door to door to meet their constituents. Both techniques are supposed to best answer what they believe to be the expectations of citizens who value access and attention to constituents. Countries where there are few statutory limits on the use of new technologies for political purposes and actual structural incentives to employ them, have witnessed a shift in what political campaigns look like. The United States is often used to buttress that point. Candidates buying ad space from media corporations became prevalent as early as the 1920s. In the 1930s they moved to the radio, and in the 1950s to television. The 1980s saw the rise of new marketing tools (e.g. direct mail) before these gave way in the late 1990s to the Internet and social media. Still, as was already mentioned above, the importance of digital campaigns must not be overstated. In their review of state party online presence in the 2000 US elections, Farmer and Fender (2005) demonstrated that not all state parties actually took advantage of the possibilities offered by new technologies. Instead many state party websites seemed to have been mostly empty shells, with inelegant graphics and no useful content. On the other end of the spectrum, one could also find state-of-the-art websites with fully functioning streaming videos and all the requisite digital expertise. It is also worth noting that the development of these new methods of political communication is not always impeded by legislation. In some countries, it is rather social norms that lead candidates to display some restraint and at least give the appearance of being reluctant to ask for votes. This expectation of modesty is often associated with Scandinavian cultures, but it can be found elsewhere (Daloz 2006) . Especially where there was a long tradition of suffrage restrictions, a time when candidates and voters were to be found among the select few, one did not dare to campaign for office but was instead expected to semi-spontaneously emerge on the strength of personal attributes -and with not-so-subtle backing by friends and relatives (Tudesq 1964) . Social taboos can lead party organizations to abstain from political advertising overkill just because it would be seen as gauche and might eventually prove counterproductive. This tradition continues to haunt our modern democracies. Pierre Joxe was a famous French politician who, for well over 25 years, was a very close ally of François Mitterrand. In the 1970s and 1980s, as he was running for a seat in the National Assembly in the 5th district of Saône-et-Loire, he was faced with the voters of this rural district, who were wary of aggressive 'American-style' electioneering with placards and leaflets (Joxe 1997) . As he ensconced himself in this district and became a fixture in it, he had absolutely no need for partisan propaganda to ensure his name recognition. In a certain way, because they become so well known and legitimate for having been in the district for so long, incumbents are often spared the indignity of actually running for office and communicating with their voters. As Jennifer Steen (2006) demonstrated with her study of self-financed candidates, even in the United States, elected office does actually seldom go to the highest bidder. On top of this, specific legislation trying to regulate campaign finance and political communication also impacts the behavior of party organizations and candidates. It is to this relationship that we now turn.
HOW LEGISLATION INFLUENCES HOW MUCH MONEY IS SPENT ON POLITICAL PROPAGANDA AND WHAT MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ARE USED
Students of political party funding find themselves in a situation that could be compared with that of a natural experiment, because they can easily compare countries where political advertising is legal and those where it is not and start to draw some conclusions. Each democratic system has to face the conundrum of how to allow for the maximum freedom of expression and, at the same time, ensure equal representation of all viewpoints to ensure the citizenry can make an enlightened choice. The tension between freedom and equality in the field of political advertising ensures that no solution is without flaws. In a system that insists on freedom of expression and simply allows for parties and candidates to advertise on all media, the danger would be that -in a media environment dominated by television where the supply of airtime is constrained -the dramatic spike in demand for precious access around election time would ensure that advertising rates on TV become so prohibitively expensive that only the richest parties or candidates could afford to broadcast their views.
Most countries have tried to solve this problem by offering free airtime to political candidates. A comparative review led to the construction of a database (Ohman 2012) that details whether countries offer free or subsidized media access. This database allows us to see that this practice has become widespread, with more than two thirds of the countries intervening in such a way. The practice is quite common in Latin America (Austin, Tjernström 2003) , with some different systems depending on whether the government orders only public media or also private media corporations to make some time slots available for free for electoral messages and whether paid political advertising is allowed, regulated or banned altogether, as is the case in Brazil and Chile. When the state provides for free or subsidized media access, it has to decide how to allocate airtime among the parties and candidates, with some countries choosing to give equal access to all candidates or parties and others doing it in proportion with their past electoral success. The choices made on that point have to be linked with the issue of the cartel party discussed in several chapters in this Handbook (notably Chapter 5).
Prohibition of paid political advertising is also the law of the land in France. By statute (article 15 of the decree of March 8, 2001 taken in application of the November 6, 1962 law about the election of the president) each candidate is given a set amount of airtime on TV and radio on public TV and radio stations for every round of balloting. The length for each segment is set by an independent agency, the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA), in consultation with the candidates, but it must be at least 15 minutes for the first round and 1 hour for the second round unless the two candidates who qualified choose otherwise. In practice, this means that the CSA is the producer of the 'ads' that each candidate will air. The agency contracts out this work to a professional media production firm and then ensures that the content is actually broadcast on public media. The agency struggles with how to guarantee that each candidate gets the same treatment with strict regulation of the content of the ads and, at the same time, allow for enough creative license to avoid a litany of drab campaign spots with only the candidates facing the camera reciting their traditional stump speeches. Since 2007, the rules surrounding the production of these ads have been loosened in an attempt to make them more appealing to the viewers. Candidates have been given permission to shoot outside and can even add their own internally produced visual content, provided that these inserts do not constitute more than 50 percent of the total campaign spot. Perhaps as a consequence of these changes, ratings for these special electoral ads seem to have slightly improved, with 115 million viewers in 2012 as opposed to 108 million in 2002. In the end, 250 of these campaign ads had been produced for a total cost of €1.8 million. They were broadcast for nine hours over eleven days for the first round and two hours over five days for the second one (Denis 2012 ; see also Rambaud 2016) . These fairly stringent regulations were instrumental in dramatically reducing the cost of this type of propaganda.
In the struggle between equal access and freedom of expression, it would be an understatement to say that the United States took a very different approach. Clearly, the idea that all the candidates would be given equal airtime and that the overall cost of production for political advertising on TV and the radio could fall below €2 million may seem fantastical to an American politician (and the political consultants that bill the candidate for their services). Since the 1976 landmark case Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court has tended to insist on the protection of free speech and assimilated campaign spending to speech, as in the US private media environment candidates and parties must pay to broadcast their ads. In its jurisprudence, the Court has mostly left aside the equality rationale according to which one legitimate end of campaign finance regulation could be to ensure a level playing field (see, among others, Mendilow, Brogan 2016; Hasen 2016 ). There were nonetheless certain legislative attempts to regulate the content of and financing of political messages in the media, the latest example of which being the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, better known as McCain-Feingold, after the names of its two main sponsors in the Senate. Among its various measures, the law tried to stem the rise of mostly negative 'issue ads' paid for by outside groups (unions, corporations and non-profits) or political parties to denigrate a candidate in the run-up to an election. The Supreme Court upheld most of these regulations in a 2003 decision (McConnell v. Federal Election Commission) , but they were later rendered essentially moot by the 2010 decision Citizens United v. FEC which confirmed the possibility for certain outside groups (independent expenditures committees) to freely broadcast political advertising with little constraints as to the source of funding or content as long as they remained independent from the candidates.
When candidates cannot advertise freely -whether because of an outright ban, or because of regulation on ad contents, broadcast and so on -they tend to rely more on old-fashioned methods of mobilization and propaganda centered on the work of volunteer party activists, with public rallies and door-to-door actions. It is especially true when there are constraints on how much candidates or parties are allowed to spend. The IDEA database shows that spending limits on the candidates (44 percent of countries) are more common than spending limits on the parties (29 percent) and that these types of constraints are found more often in Europe and Asia than on the other continents (Ohman 2012) . In France, a survey of the people who act as the candidates' campaign fiduciaries in local elections confirms the intuitive notion that when spending limits are set quite low, candidates revert to more conventional forms of mobilization (Phélippeau 2010 ; see also Lagroye et al. 2005) and rediscover the importance of their volunteers (Andolfatto 2002) and their proximity to the voters (Le Bart, Lefebvre 2005).
CONCLUSION
In all democracies, candidates, party organizations and many other political institutions (e.g. ministries or local government bodies) continue to allocate a major part of their resources to political communications. By taking these expenses seriously, we can deepen our understanding of the transformation of large party organizations that try to maintain connections to and within civil society. The data we can rely on remains incomplete. It does indicate, however, that political parties are adjusting to broader structural evolutions of the body politic. It also puts into question the conventional wisdom that the development of paid political advertising is responsible for the rising price tag of political propaganda. Both the historical record and more contemporary accounts force us to recalibrate our expectations of the cost of more traditional modes of mobilization.
Electoral campaigns are underpinned by competing political messages and communication efforts by candidates and parties, but the contours of this competition are undoubtedly shaped by legislation regulating whose voice can be heard and what can be said. When confronted with spending caps, party organizations and their candidates rediscover the virtues of nominally cheaper forms of propaganda (e.g. by switching from paid TV ads to the free labor of volunteers) -or forgo the limits altogether by not reporting certain expenses. Every prohibition tends to lead to new loopholes. In France, the ban on paid political advertising is pushing candidates toward online video sharing platforms to promote themselves and their ideas. In the United States, the constraints put on the fundraising of political parties and candidates has led to the growth of unaccountable outside groups who are not subject to very few limits on either the size of the contributions they receive or the origin of the funds. To quote from the oft-repeated aphorism of the US Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC, 'money like water, will always find an outlet'. The same could probably be said of political propaganda. NOTES 1. That scandal centers on a company called Bygmalion, owned by friends of Jean-François Copé, an ex-leader of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). That company first alleged having been strong-armed into falsifying Mr. Sarkozy's re-election campaign bills or risk not getting paid. Later, Jérome Lavrilleux, Mr. Sarkozy's former deputy campaign manager and Mr. Copé's lieutenant, claimed that bills for the former president's campaign were passed off as invoices for party meetings in order to skirt round France's strict limits on campaign financing. Finally, more than €20 million of 'false invoices' for Sarkozy's 2012 re-election campaign were billed as party expenses. 2. Le Pen's party is under investigation for having forced their candidates to buy overvalued campaign materials with money they borrowed from the party with very high interest rates. The scheme allegedly allowed the Front national and its contractors to pocket the generous margins while the candidates themselves were not adversely affected since their electoral spending was at least partly reimbursed by the state (Vaudano 2017 ).
